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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

1. If anyone states that large resistance movements or organizations now exist in Poland [redacted] he is dealing in wishful thinking. [October 1953]

2. The Polish Government in London via such means of communications as BBC (British Broadcasting Commission), the radio in Madrid, Spain, and Radio Free Europe constantly advise the people in Poland to refrain from attempting to form and organize large resistance movements because of the likelihood of failure and ultimate reprisals by the USSR. They also warn against the acknowledgement and acceptance of any so-called leader and organizer of such movements for fear that he may be a provocator.

3. You have read various press releases which point up resistance by the Polish workers. 25X1 [ ] no doubt [ ] individual acts take place from time to time but [ ] the press has made much of these isolated cases. However, in speaking with displaced persons and correspondence with others, [ ] would describe the political situation in the following way: Poland by and large is in a state of ready quiescence in which a spark properly directed, with visible reliable means of external support, would do the trick. This wouldn't happen however until the Poles were assured that allied forces would move in.

4. [ ] it is ridiculous to say that the Poles have made attempts to buy scarce raw materials. Polish economic activity is expressive of the plans and the needs of the USSR. If the Soviet Government is unable to procure needed materials or if, on the other hand, the Soviet Government seeks an outlet for its

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[illegible]

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finished products, it will use the Satallites as a front which serves the USSR in either case.

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25X1 5. [ ] collections have been made for the children of North Korea, for the blood bank of North Korea, and that workers in Poland have voted a day's wages for North Korean relief (not willingly [ ]). Korean orphans in large numbers have been settled in Poland, Korean students are now enrolled in Polish schools, and Korean delegates have made many speeches in Poland. Rumors [ ] that the Polish Government has called for volunteers for Korea to assist in reconstruction. These calls haven't met with notable success, however, some technicians have been dispatched to Korea to assist in reconstructing demolished factories. Some machinery has been sent to Korea in recent months from Poland. Lathes and machine tools are two items which [ ] have been exported. Whether or not such shipments to North Korea find their way into China is unknown [ ].

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#### Paramilitary

25X1 6. With reference to paramilitary training in Poland [ ] the government is taking advantage of such existing functions as universities, summer camps, and athletic groups. [ ] the government has instituted both pre and paramilitary training as a segment of the curriculum and agenda for these groups in particular.

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#### Purpose of New Passports

7. The questionnaires which applicants must complete for the issuance of new passports in Poland are from seven to eight pages long. These questionnaires contain innumerable questions. The completion of these questionnaires is obligatory for two reasons:
  - a. The government is interested in determining the background of the individual—that is, to learn whether or not the individual is a former bourgeois, a member of the privileged class of workers, or the less privileged class of farmers. This measure seems to be a decisive condition for any important appointment to the privileged class of workers. It is further designed to get all the information possible on an individual with the possibility of using this information as a lever to induce the individual to perform acts for the state which he is most capable of performing. For instance, if it is learned from the questionnaire that a person has relatives abroad, particularly in the US, who could supply information to the Polish Government, this individual could be forced to correspond with such relatives in view of possible information being derived from such correspondence.
  - b. With the issuance of new passports the security forces will be able to identify readily any person and further it will make more facile the task of determining forgery by foreign agents or strangers in the community. It is also planned to control the movements of people inside Poland because of the obligation of every citizen when arriving in any locality to register with the police. The police then stamp the passport. Thus the security forces will be able to determine from the new passport and the stamps previous movements of the individual. In my own estimation this will make organization and operation of any potential resistance groups exceptionally difficult.
8. The issuance of new passports hasn't been discontinued, however, the entire procedure, particularly the questionnaires, is complicated; consequently it has been a slow process.

#### Collectivization

- 25X1 9. In looking over collectivization of land in Poland [ ] prior to World War II less than 14% of the land was possessed by so-called large landowners. The concept of large landowners can be easily misconstrued by those

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not familiar with the agrarian pattern in Poland. In Poland 640 acres possessed by one owner was unusual. The large holdings were usually half that amount. The remaining 86% of the land was in the hands of the peasants and the Polish State.

10. The Soviets used two methods for establishing collectivization. In central Poland they tried persuasion by pointing out to the farmers the advantages of collective farming and that it would be a big step forward in scientific agriculture. Here collectivization was originally met with determined resistance. In the realization that such resistance would have to be worn down, the Communists (for some reason known only to themselves) insisted that the democratic solution to the problem would be expressed in the form of balloting for or against collectivization. This gave the Communists sufficient time to employ pressure and persuasion against the opposing farmers. [For good statistical information concerning the year to year development of collective farming in Central Europe see the publications by the Free Europe Committee.]
11. The second phase or approach to collectivization in the so-called liberated areas [East Prussia, the Oder-Neisse section] was quite different from the approach in central Poland. These areas were largely resettled by Poles who had succeeded in escaping the eastern parts of Poland which had been annexed by the USSR. The resettlement of this population was handled under rules and regulations laid down by the Communist government of Poland. It wasn't much of a problem for the government wasn't faced with the problem of transition from private ownership to collectivistic ownership. They simply brought farmers to already existing collective farms. For this reason collectivization was much faster than in remaining parts of Poland.
12. The whole idea of collective ownership is repulsive to the majority of the population and has proved itself defective in operation. Much of the deficit in production is being ascribed to the reluctance of the population to resign themselves to that form of farming.
13. I don't believe that opposition to collective farming varies with the seasons but that it is most noticeable during the peak of harvest because the Poles ease up whenever bumper crops are evident. If there are signs of less intensity in farming, it is due primarily to faulty organizational planning because the opposition is constant.

#### The Government and the Catholic Church

14. As you know government opposition to the church began with the persecution of the lower clergy. It began reaching into the higher ranks finally materializing in the diocese, the bishoprics, and the archdiocese. It climaxed in the direct attack on Bishop Kaczmarek and by the recent internment of Cardinal Wyszynski (Vishinsky). All information is rather indicative of the fact that they have decided to go all out against, if not the church as such, the hierarchy itself. The government is still steps behind in the fight against religion per se with its godless propaganda which emanated from the USSR proper. The official slogan in Poland regarding the church is "Obtain its loyalty towards the State." The Communists are not attacking religion per se because they are pretending to abide by the new Communist-voted constitution which guarantees the freedom of religion. Of course, this situation should be considered only as transitory to the desire of complete subjugation of the church. The role of the Church of Poland under its present hierarchy is not planned to constitute a network of underground resistance but to stand as a guardian of spiritual and moral values of the population. This naturally means opposition to the Communist doctrine.
15. Three years ago [1950] an understanding, or rather a pact, was signed between the hierarchy and the government in order to draw a line separating the interests of the church from the interests of the state and to guarantee the satisfactory functioning of both bodies side by side. That pact was met with suspicion by the

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West and completely misunderstood as a surrender of the church to the state. This pact provided for the restriction of church and clergy activities to the church. It made the hierarchy responsible for restraining the clergy from entering politics or influencing the faithful in political matters. On the other hand it guaranteed the church full autonomy in spiritual and religious matters.

16. It appears obvious that both contracting parties had no confidence in the execution of the provisions of the pact. Since that time a pastoral letter signed by all of the Polish bishops has been issued to all of the clergy who in turn read it during church services. This letter attempted to explain the basic agreements reached in the three year-old pact. It also emphasized to the clergy and the church faithful the necessity for the strictest observance of the commitments agreed to by the hierarchy. Obviously, the government did not issue any such instructions to its agencies. Consequently complaints by the hierarchy were made to the Communist government. These complaints pointed out the infractions of various provisions by the government and the fight was on. (The church was accused of interfering with Party meetings because the worshippers attended church services during hours when Party meetings were held; free movement by the clergy was curtailed, etc.). The League of Loyal Priests, which is comprised of clergymen with doubtful reputations, and the Godless League were in the forefront in accusing the church of violating its agreements.
17. Regardless of all efforts by the hierarchy and the clergy, the people still consider that the only place where, at least temporarily, they can have the feeling of being free citizens, is within the church. They look upon the church as their leader in the moral effort to have the freedom of Poland restored. Therefore, the whole atmosphere in the church must be considered as definitely hostile to the Communist regime and the regime knows it.

#### Communization Deviationism

18. The old Polish Committee of Liberation headed by Wanda Wasilewska formed the nucleus for the Lublin Government. Its membership, comprised essentially of Communists included a number of Communists who were ideologically motivated, but even though Communists, trained in the USSR, they were still Poles at heart. In their plans for communizing Poland they looked to the USSR for friendly support, just as 99 percent of the Poles expected the Western powers to help restore a free Poland. It appeared to me that the ideological Polish Communists had unlimited faith in Stalin and his promises. When they returned to Poland and helped Mikolajczyk form the Provisional Government they had a strong desire to see Poland become a Communist State, friendly and in strict cooperation with the USSR. During the first few weeks of existence of the Provisional Government it appeared that their dreams would be realized. There was no visible interference from the USSR. The Polish Communists made splendid propaganda in Poland by stressing Polish patriotism, the brotherly help received from the Soviet Union, happiness to be attained under the new government, pledging everlasting loyalty to their Soviet brothers, etc. They were so sincere that they succeeded in convincing quite a number of people who actually fell for their propaganda. Eventually much of the population began to relax feeling that friendship with the Soviet Union was necessary, they couldn't remain isolated. This feeling didn't last very long for the machinery of Soviet plans was set in motion. The first to recognize the full impact of the Soviet plans were top Communist Polish leaders with the result that some defection of top leaders began. The psychology of the Polish Nationalist Communists and their trust in Stalin had actually damaged their own cause. They realized that they had served as tools for the eventual enslavement of Poland.
19. The first clash between top Polish Communists and the USSR was on an economical ground and not an ideological difference. The first treaty with the USSR (basis for the clash) was a commercial one. Drawn up by the USSR it stipulated that the Poles had to deliver 12 million tons of coal per year to the Soviet Union at a cost which was far under cost of production. The Nationalist Communists of Poland realized that in no time at all the mining industry of Poland would be operating on the deficit side of the ledger.

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20. The second clash developed when a plan for the industrial expansion of Polish industry was delivered under executive order from the Kremlin. This plan totally ignoring one which had been worked out by the Polish Government, actually made of Poland an economic and industrial cell devised to fit into the pattern of Soviet economy. It would result in an unsound and economically unjustifiable plan of super growth of Polish heavy industries far beyond the needs of the country or beyond the possibilities of a reasonable marketing abroad. The Polish Communists immediately discerned that the plan was devised to serve Soviet economy. These discrepancies between interests of Polish planned economy and the Soviet plan made it clear to some of the top Communists that the actual plan of the Kremlin was, namely, the inclusion of Poland as an integral part of the Soviet Union.
  21. Immediately thereafter a difference of opinions was aroused in top groups of Polish Communists. One segment believed that through persuasion or by reaffirming their loyalty to the USSR they could succeed in convincing the Kremlin to plan the economy in correlation with the interests and needs of Poland. Assuring themselves that they were right in their faith in the Soviet Union and that there was purity in the intentions of the USSR, this group risked some public statements concerning their beliefs. I believe that they intended to pacify the minds of others, particularly public opinion which was aware of the situation. In fact public opinion if adverse would have threatened the possible success of a drive for new Party members which was being undertaken. They didn't realize (maybe a few did) that they were actually signing their own political death warrants by these public utterances.
  22. Other members of the top layer of Polish Communist leaders who either from caution, or simply not to compromise their positions, remained silent on the subject. They sensed the unfavorable reactions coming from Moscow concerning the outspoken group of Polish Commies. In fact they took a negative stand accusing their outspoken comrades of National Chauvinism and of the betrayal of the Communist cause. This is the group which still remains in power in Poland and forms the central corps for the PZPR (Polish Communist Party).
  23. The PZPR is composed now [October 1953] of a very thin layer of ideological Communists which is being reduced in numbers, of a more numerous egotistically-minded group of Communists who, in exchange for advantages offered to them by the Kremlin, are ready to accept any dirty assignment given them by Moscow. Finally, the PZPR consists of an overwhelming majority of people who have been forced by pressure to join and carry out assigned tasks. This group, morally not strong enough to refuse, excuse themselves for belonging to the party in two ways: (1) pretending that by membership in the Party they can use their influence in the interests of the Polish people, and (2) by persuading themselves that overt resistance would be fruitless and therefore not worth trying. The people in this latter category are recruited into the Party mostly by a promise of advancement (advancement being restricted to members of the Party), by economic advantages, by promises that their children will have the advantage of higher education, and in some cases members are also recruited under promises of lenience to relatives already arrested by the political police. It would be fallacy to disregard the dangers which this group represent. Originally, joining of the Party is represented to them as a pure formality. However, the gradual pressure applied causes them to go all out in serving the purpose of the Party. Very few actually succeed in limiting their activities to the mere registration which they underwent in joining the Party. The stubborn ones who refuse to go along are being exposed as enemies of the State and are actually more ruthlessly treated than non-Communists.
  24. To speak of factions within the Communist Party is to make a mistake as to the whole Soviet system. If the man in the street can no longer trust his personal friends and relatives the higher ups in the Party distrust of each other borders on obsession.
- Communist Bureaucracy
25. If, however, it is out of the question to expect the existence of political alignments within the party there is one contra-distinction which can be applied as

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a denominator in grouping members of Communist functionaries. As you know, in the Communist bureaucracy it is an established rule that any advancement to a higher position within the Party must be sponsored by personal references from some higher functionary. Thus the personnel files of both the sponsor as well as the sponsored party are kept by the political police. Special annotations are made referring to who sponsored whom, with the result that an imaginary line can be drawn down from each high official separating those whom he personally sponsored from the rest of the Communist bureaucracy. This actually constitutes a chain reaching down from cabinet members to the lowest members. In case of a purge of the top man all of those linked to him are endangered. In most cases, however, the members below the top man succeed in saving their skins by openly attacking their benefactor as soon as it becomes evident that he is doomed. However, quite a number of his most intimate collaborators usually share his fate. That explains the number of victims involved in each purge of a top official.

26. [ ] these purges have not occurred too frequently in Poland. [ ]

25X1 [ ] no extensive purges in conjunction with the purge of Beria. The Polish  
25X1 Communists have denounced Beria perhaps to save their own skins. It may also mean  
25X1 that the top Communist team in Poland is loyal to Moscow or that its members  
have been clever and cautious enough not to betray their real point of view. As  
of the moment they seem to devotedly execute all the orders received and lend no  
cause for apprehension so far as the Soviet Union is concerned. Only time can  
justify either of the above explanations.

27. It doesn't appear that the PZPR is directly connected with or acting under orders  
of the Soviet Communist Party. The function of governing Poland by the Soviet is  
25X1 being exercised exclusively through the government of the USSR which, of course,  
practically means the Soviet Communist Party. [ ] it is being  
governed through diplomatic channels, namely, the Soviet Ambassador in Warsaw.  
It is an ascertained fact that no basic political or economic moves concerning  
Poland are undertaken by the Polish Government without prior consultation and the  
approval of the Soviet Ambassador. On exceptional occasions members of the Polish  
Government are called to Moscow for direct consultations, actually they are in  
Moscow to receive orders or to be reprimanded. To date [October 1953] the policy  
of the USSR seems to be directed towards developing the general idea throughout  
Poland that the Polish Government is acting independently of the USSR; that no  
25X1 pressure is being applied and that the relations between the two countries are  
being determined by respectively assigned agreements as officially published.

28. [ ] public opinion in Poland has not been deceived by this camouflage  
and the consensus [ ] is that the country is being enslaved, that it is  
subject to ruthless exploitation, that the Soviet is attempting systematic Russi-  
fication and ultimately that Poland is being prepared for the final goal of the  
Soviet plan - the incorporation of Poland into the Soviet Union.

29. The Poles are fully aware that the Soviet plans for Poland are in direct opposition  
to the traditional Polish striving for liberty. This provokes an intensification  
of hatred towards the USSR. No doubt this feeling is shared by a number of Polish  
Communists, that is, the rank and file Party members. This hatred plus their  
devotion to their church provides a strong ideological tie against the Soviet  
and Sovietization.

30. There is only one sector of political thinking where the Poles might eventually  
consider the possibility of aligning themselves with the Soviet and that is the  
problem of the so-called "liberated areas". (The land taken from Germany.) This  
25X1 problem is being continuously exploited by Communist propaganda which portrays to  
the Poles that any cooperation with the Western democracies sold on the idea of a  
strong Germany would mean for them the loss of these areas. This problem is pre-  
25X1 dominant over all other considerations in the minds of the Poles. [ ]  
[ ] it supersedes the question of liberation from Communist domination which  
all Poles consider as transitory. They firmly believe that sooner or later they  
will be free again but that loss of these territories would be final and irreparable.

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